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Abdolkarim Soroush (b.1945) is an Iranian philoso-
pher-thinker whose innovative ideas on religious re-
form are sure to win him a place among the most
prominent Muslim reformers of this century. A grad-
uate of Tehran University in pharmacology, Soroush
undertook postgraduate studies in history and the
philosophy of science at the University of London in
the early 1970s. His searching mind, already familiar
with Islamic and Western classical philosophical tra-
ditions, was captivated by modern philosophy. 
Abdolkarim Soroush
New ÔRevival of
Religious SciencesÕ
SoroushÕs goal goes beyond unsystematic
reforms in certain selected, mostly legal,
matters and his plan is multidimensional. Of
its two major aspects, one is to prune ele-
ments and understandings that are consid-
ered superfluous and stagnant and have
often obscured the essence of religion. The
other is to equip religion with extra-religious
means and values, chiefly in reconciling rea-
son and revelation.
Reason and revelation
His pathology of contemporary Islam sur-
faces numerous ills. Although post-revolu-
tionary conditions in Iran are central to his di-
agnosis, Soroush has no difficulty identifying
these problems all over the Muslim world.
First, he sees the ideologizing of Islam, the
prevalent mode of Islamic resurgence since
the 1960s, as detrimental to the essence of re-
ligion. Among other things, it makes religion
an instrument for attaining goals. It promotes
a dogmatic understanding of religion con-
cerned with exoteric, accidental aspects, ig-
noring deeper meanings and resulting in in-
tellectual rigidity and exclusivism. It fixes one
understanding of religion as final, absolute,
official, and beyond criticism. Demanding its
official interpreters, it entrusts the clergy with
a priori privileges and gives access to reli-
gious totalitarianism at societal and political
levels. Soroush calls this the ÔIslam of identityÕ.
At best, it is an ideological means that may
help Muslims overcome their modernity-in-
spired Ôcrisis of identityÕ; whereas the ÔIslam of
truthÕ, understood as the essential truths to
which prophets have invited humankind, is
only remotely related to this ÔexpedientalÕ
Islam.
A second problem is the undue emphasis
given to legal aspects of Islam (sharicah and
fiqh) at the cost of ethics and theology.
SoroushÕs critique of this imbalance targets
traditionalists and some modernists alike, the
former for reducing Islam to fiqh. The latter,
trapped in this short-sightedness, have lost
their ability to recognize ills at a deeper level
and have thus reduced reform to partial and
unsystematic legal solutions. Soroush does
not underestimate the significance of fiqh
and sharicah. What he argues against is ascrib-
ing to it primacy, comprehensiveness and fi-
nality. Inspired by his ÔmentorÕ Al-Ghazali, he
believes that fiqh is neither the core of Islam
nor its totality and should thus be confined to
its own sphere. Moreover, a fiqh-based under-
standing of Islam puts a premium on camal
(outward practices) rather than iman (inner
faith). It envisions a society wherein the en-
forcement of the sharicah, ritualism and uni-
formity in religious experience prevail. This
absence of plurality leads to hypocrisy and
monopoly on truth.
These two ills have not only caused a stag-
nation in religious thought, they have pro-
moted a ÔmaximalistÕ view of religion. They
have prevented a dialogue among Islamic re-
ligious sciences and between Islam and the
human sciences, necessary components to a
revitalization of Islamic thought. Only
through such recognition and willingness to
enter into a give-and-take process will Islamic
thought break the shackles of rigidity and ab-
solutism. This is a summons to the invigorat-
ing role of reason, a call deeply aligned with
Muctazilite rationalism and resonating with
the pleas of Muhammad Abduh and Muham-
mad Iqbal.
A ÔmaximalistÕ view of religion affirms that
what Muslims need to solve their problems or
administer their public and personal lives is all
provided in Islam as if religion were a reposi-
tory of pre-packaged solutions for all prob-
lems at all times. This deprives Muslims of the
intellectual challenge and benefit of other
means and values. In practice, it recedes to
fiqh, which, in its most lively manifestation,
ijtihad, is ironically the most in need of extra-
religious knowledge. A ÔmaximalistÕ view of
religion is perhaps best exemplified in the
prevailing discourse on Islam and politics. It
teaches that sharicah is an all-comprehensive
system of law that provides for political
needs. This juridical approach to politics not
only disregards the very nature of the matter,
it ends in some un-resolvable contradictions.
Islam and democracy
Soroush argues that discussion about Islam
and politics should be approached from out-
side of religion. Reconciling religion and
democracy is of the same nature as reconcil-
ing reason and revelation; both involve extra-
religious values and means. In essence, the
nature of the state and values and methods of
governance are not matters of religious ju-
risprudence but belong to political philoso-
phy. With regard to religion, they should be
addressed in kalam (theology). Human be-
ings qua human beings are entitled to a priori
rights, including political ones. Pivotal values
of democracy Ð justice and freedom Ð are
extra-religious, though upheld by religious
systems. Methods of governance are also
non-religious. Administering public life is a ra-
tional matter that should benefit from mod-
ern social sciences, economics and adminis-
tration. Fiqh is neither a science of administra-
tion nor a government platform. Anything
found in religion in this respect is ÔminimalÕ
and ÔaccidentalÕ; it is not ÔessentialÕ to religion.
Arguing for the possibility of a religious de-
mocratic state, Soroush believes that if
democracy is irreconcilable with the norma-
tive legal reading of Islam, it can be compati-
ble with another understanding that accords
primacy to human values such as rationality,
justice, freedom and human rights. Therefore,
democracy can work in a religious society
only if the respective theoretical foundations
are harmonized.
Islam and modernity
Acutely aware of an epistemological break
between the old and modern worlds, Soroush
believes that any serious attempt at Islamic
modernism should begin by equipping itself
with modern concepts, perceptual outlooks
and intellectual means. Of the several issues
addressed by Soroush, two are modern: criti-
cal reason vs. traditional hermeneutical rea-
son, and rights vs. duties.
Modern Muslim thought needs to adopt
critical reasoning, a tool that not only involves
a critical historical approach to traditional reli-
gious paradigms but can also suggest alter-
natives. One of the most decisive paradigmat-
ic changes of the modern world is that most
of its concepts and institutions are right-
based, reflecting the shift in human self-per-
ception from duty-bearing to right-bearing.
Equally critical of the shortcomings of the
past duty-oriented mentality and the current
right-oriented mentality, Soroush proposes a
third paradigm in which elements of rational-
ity and rights are tempered by a form of reli-
giosity that prevents human beings from as-
suming God-like characteristics and obliges
them to God. However, the nature and defini-
tion of this religiosity and obligation differ
radically from conventional notions that are
primarily geared to external behaviour.
Far from inviting secularism, Soroush ad-
vances a learned and examined kind of reli-
giosity. This dimension of his project deals,
one might say, with reviving a higher mystical
type of religiosity. It is an Ôexperiential reli-
giosityÕ based on the love of God, the proto-
type of which is the Ôprophetic experienceÕ of
Muhammad. What the demystified modern
world is in need of is an ÔexperientialÕ not Ôex-
pedientalÕ religiosity where God is experi-
enced as a gracious Beloved, not as a stern
Law-giver. His commands are observed not
out of obligation to legal duties but out of
compulsion of love.
SoroushÕs reform plan targets the short-
comings of both tradition and modernity.
While advocating adoption of certain modern
elements to strengthen the tradition, it
searches the deep layers of tradition to offer a
remedy for the spiritual impoverishment of
the modern age. In order to become function-
al in the modern world, religion needs to in-
teract meaningfully with modern concepts,
outlooks and institutions. To this end,
Soroush moves reform from the plane of fiqh
to deeper levels of theology and philosophy
where essential concepts of God, humankind
and religiosity are to be redefined. This is
predicated on the recognition of the need for
a dialogical pluralism between inside and
outside of religious intellectual fields. The
complementarity of SoroushÕs project lies in
the fact that it invigorates the intellectual ra-
tional tradition of Islam and at the same time
accentuates its spiritual richness. The effect is
to restrain the arrogance and self-centred-
ness of modern humankind.
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Prior to postgraduate work, Soroush was
long preoccupied with textual interpreta-
tion Ð a product of his extensive, systematic
study of QurÕanic exegesis, and classical the-
ological, mystical and philosophical works
such as Rumi and Al-Ghazali. These joined
with new insights to draw him into a vortex
of intellectual activity aimed at re-evaluat-
ing traditional metaphysics in order to find a
convincing solution to the relationship be-
tween science and metaphysics/reason and
revelation. Context has also contributed to
SoroushÕs intellectual fruition as a Muslim
reformer. In the 1960s, as a religiously com-
mitted and socio-politically concerned stu-
dent, he pondered revivalist literature from
Al-Afghani to Ali S h a r ica t i. Since returning to
Iran shortly after the 1979 revolution, he has
experienced the rule of an Islamic govern-
ment, the supremacy of an ideologized
Islam, and the implementation of a jurispru-
dential understanding of Islam.
Contraction and expansion
His turbulent yet rewarding intellectual
journey culminated in the development of
his epistemological/hermeneutical ÔTheory
of Contraction and Expansion of Religious
KnowledgeÕ. This theory, constituting the
foundation stone of SoroushÕs reform plan,
distinguishes him from other revivalists.
Notwithstanding his deep appreciation of
their endeavours, Soroush believes that his
theory provides a hitherto absent but vital
contribution, that is, an epistemological
structure. To reconcile the immutable (reli-
gion) with change (dynamic world) it is nec-
essary to distinguish between religion and
religious knowledge. Religion is divine, eter-
nal, immutable and sacred, while human un-
derstanding of it is in constant exchange
with every field of human knowledge. As
such, religious knowledge is in flux, relative,
and time-bound. This recognition means
that issues of reform can be addressed with-
out compromising the sacredness of reli-
gion. RevivalistsÕ neglect of this foundation
has diverted their attention from fundamen-
tal questions. Consequently, solutions,
though valuable, have been provisional.
Nevertheless, Soroush claims neither perfec-
tion nor finality for his approach.
